# 1AC- Generic Util

## 1AC- materials

### 1- Growth

#### Advantage 1 is growth

#### Restrictions on campus speech undermine the free exchange of ideas—that kills economic growth and competitiveness

**Millsap 16** [Adam Millsap (research fellow for the State and Local Policy Project with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University). “Free Speech Is Good for the Economy.” U.S. News and World Report. May 23rd, 2016. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-05-23/free-speech-is-good-for-the-economy]

Commencement season is now underway, and President Barack Obama recently had the honor of speaking at Howard University. His speech touched on a variety of topics, including the troubling trend of colleges canceling speakers that some students and faculty find offensive. The president is right that people should engage with one another on the battlefield of ideas rather than try to silence those with whom they disagree. As many people have pointed out, this engagement is important for a well-functioning democracy. But what people may not realize is that it's critical for a well-functioning economy as well. New ideas and innovation are necessary for sustaining economic growth, and there's a large body of evidence that emphasizes the exchange of ideas as an important component of an innovative economy. The United States has been especially successful at fostering innovation and growth in the technology sector. Facebook's market capitalization alone is twice the size of all the large European tech giants combined. There's good reason to believe that America's economic prosperity in this rapidly changing sector is due to its commitment to the free exchange of ideas. The theory that ideas and innovation are crucial to economic growth is an old one. Joseph Schumpeter's "creative destruction" is perhaps the best known explanation of the role that innovation plays in the economy. Schumpeter explained that competition requires firms to constantly innovate, since those that don't will quickly be replaced by those that do. Ultimately micro-level creative destruction helps drive macro-level economic growth. But not all countries have to be innovators in order to grow. From the 1950s until the mid-'80s the Solow growth model was the primary tool of economists who studied economic growth. One of its main predictions was that poorer countries would eventually catch up to, or converge with, rich countries. The intuitive reasoning behind the theory of convergence is that poor countries could simply imitate the technological innovation of rich countries and grow accordingly. Instead of spending time and resources reinventing the internal combustion engine, the airplane, antibiotics or the assembly line, all countries like China and India had to do was start using them. But while imitation is a viable method of generating economic growth when a country is lagging behind, it can't go on forever. Once a country reaches the economic frontier – where there are no longer any countries to imitate – only innovation and technological progress can generate additional growth. The United States has been on the frontier for at least a century and our economic growth is primarily powered by our ability to innovate. Innovation itself is often described as an output of a country – e.g. the United States "leads the world in innovation" – but this language obscures where innovation actually takes place. It happens locally; individuals, not countries, innovate. Engineers and scientists working for companies, laboratories and universities and people tinkering in their garage, shed or basement are the real drivers of innovation, and most of this innovation occurs in cities. The large amount of specialized knowledge in cities, along with the rapid dissemination of information, is what fosters innovation. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that a city's success is proportional to the ability of its residents to innovate and generate new ideas. Cities devoid of entrepreneurs who routinely generate new ideas will stagnate and decay. And stagnation at the local level inevitably leads to stagnation at the national level. Researchers routinely point out that the proximity of people in cities is one of the primary reasons most innovation occurs there, but the exact mechanism through which the transfer of knowledge and ideas takes place is often omitted. The assumption seems to be that simply putting a bunch of people together on the same city block will create innovation. But the actual communication part is a crucial input into the production of innovation. As economists Curtis Simon and Clark Nardinelli note in their study of the growth of English cities in the 19th and 20th centuries: "The creativity of the market economy – the increasing returns so important in modern growth theory – in large part arises from what happens when people with information get together and talk. The talk is necessary to turn information into productive knowledge." Since spreading ideas and information requires communication – people talking to one another, attending lectures and presentations, watching videos, etc. – it's likely that limiting speech, either formally or informally, would have pernicious effects on innovation and harm economic growth in the United States. Despite the robust protections of the First Amendment and Americans' long history of exercising their right to free speech, there are signs that a significant portion of society is questioning how far this right should extend. College students around the country are increasingly calling for limits on speech. Several colleges have cancelled speakers due to the vocal opposition of students and faculty, and some college administrations are beginning to favor safety and inclusivity over the free exchange of ideas. Even high schools are getting on board; after students at a Bronx high school recently threatened to walk out on former presidential candidate Ted Cruz, his appearance was cancelled. The combination of these incidents reveals that many of the next generation of teachers, politicians, government administrators and business people are comfortable with suppressing speech they personally don't like. While it's true that speech that offends a large portion of the population, or that criticizes a specific group, is unlikely to be the type of speech that leads to innovation, this criticism in large part misses the point. What matters is not whether restrictions on offensive, hurtful or "hate" speech harm innovation directly, but whether such restrictions significantly reduce the likelihood of engaging in conversation in general. It's hard to predict where a conversation will end up. While civilized people should try to be sensitive to others, the subjectivity of offensive speech makes it difficult to always say the "right" thing. If the penalty for saying the "wrong" thing is large enough, even a small probability of digressing to a sensitive topic can be enough to discourage conversation. Currently the United States is one of the most economically competitive countries in the world as well as the most supportive of free expression. I don't think this is a coincidence: America's unique commitment to free speech and the open exchange of ideas has given entrepreneurs in the United States a competitive advantage. Efforts to clamp down on speech at the local level for the sake of safety and inclusivity may seem largely benign at first. But over time a climate that is hostile to certain forms of speech can have a chilling effect on all speech. As an economic leader, we rely on the free exchange of ideas and information for the serendipitous discoveries that increase our standard of living, and because of this, the long-term costs of stifling speech are larger than commonly recognized.

#### The US is key to the global economy for the foreseeable future- but their on the brink of decrease now

**High 12/5** [(Peter. Reporter on Innovative ideas in the world of information technology) Forbes . He is in an interview with Peter Zeihan (Geopolitical Strategist Peter Zeihan is a global energy, demographic and security expert, and the author of [The Accidental Superpower: The Next Generation of American Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder](https://www.amazon.com/Accidental-Superpower-Generation-American-Preeminence/dp/1455583685/ref=as_sl_pc_qf_sp_asin_til?tag=mestll-20&linkCode=w00&linkId=ee654abc6a0dc69f30fb962b418a06f2&creativeASIN=1455583685" \t "_blank). He is an advisor to the US State Department and to the Washington, DC think tank community. In his book, he notes that the reassertion of geopolitics as the rule by which the world operates; global demographic inversions; and shale energy will all lead to a period of U.S. domination across the next half century and possibly beyond. I recently spoke with Zeihan, and our conversation covered these changes, the U.S.’s changing role in global security and trade; the sectors that will be changed most, countries that are the best targets for trade by the United States, as well as a variety of other topics) “Reasons Why The US Will Dominate The World Economy For The Foreseeable Future” Dec 5, 2016. http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterhigh/2016/12/05/reasons-why-the-us-will-dominate-the-world-economy-for-the-foreseeable-future/#63cf66623841. ] NB

Peter High: In your book, The Accidental Superpower, you talked about how a variety of rules that we have come to take as given over the past seventy years are going to be changed regarding geopolitics. Especially considering the recent election, I would be curious about how the theses you had posited in that book remain, are amplified, or are changed. Peter Zeihan: There are a couple of things going on simultaneously. First, because of demographic aging on a global scale, the United States is emerging as the only market over the long-term. Second, the United States is backing away from the world. It is reducing the American footprint overseas while its ability to intervene increases. What we have done with Special Forces, what we are doing with drones, what we are doing with satellite tech—the ability to reach out is higher than it has been for decades. But our need to do that with troops on the ground or maintaining the day-to-day order of the international system is going away. Third, Trump is taking a lot of the trends that already existed in American politics and kicked them up a notch. We are already going through this period of new isolationism and here comes a trade warrior who wants to renegotiate every trade deal on the books, specifically fingering Mexico and China, two of our three biggest trading partners. You put these three things together and you get a United States that is transitioning from being the global guarantor of security, global trade, and energy markets to one that, at best, has stepped back from it all and, more likely, even sees a vested interest in disrupting it to a certain degree. At the same time, the U.S. is the only market. The split between successful countries and failed countries in the future is how well can you buddy up with the only country that matters? Everything else is going to be a free for all. In the United States, you have the market, the financial capital, the labor system, the consumption base, the energy—and you can project power out, rather than have to defend your own borders. That does not exist anywhere else on the planet, and is not going to exist anywhere else on the planet in the next fifty years. The only question in my mind for the last few years has been “What is the speed of the transition?” Under a President Hillary Clinton, it would have taken four to eight years. Under President-elect Donald Trump, it will probably take four to eight months. The year 2017 is shaping up to be the most dynamic year in international affairs since at least 1945. High: Are you suggesting that some of what we are seeing with the positive reaction of the markets in the U.S. is symptomatic or emblematic of some positive economic changes for the U.S.? Are these sustainable from your perspective? Zeihan: I would not bet too much on any specific economic trend that seems to be manifested on Wall Street for the last couple of weeks. The market had fully positioned itself for a Clinton victory and when that did not happen, everyone went scrambling in every other direction they could imagine. Whether Trump’s economic plans are good for the mid- and the long-term, we really do not know yet. The first of three things that Trump says he is going to attack in his first couple of months is corporate tax reform, which is solid. I think there is a surprising amount of bipartisan support for that in Congress already. The second is healthcare. That will be a hell of a fight, but with control over Congress, the Executive Branch and, probably very soon, the courts, that is one that Trump can win, just not in the first 30 days. The third one is immigration. In the first stage, it is going to be about capacity building. If he really is serious about doing mass deportations, then there will need to be a fair overhaul and bulking up of INS. That is not something you can do in a month. Those three policies are not going to generate short-term results. We will not see the first economic outcome for that for two years, so do not hold your breath. High: Given the power that America will have to choose the markets in which to emphasize, where do you believe the country should focus? Zeihan: First, I would argue that the U.S. has not had a meaningful foreign policy towards either East Asian or Western Europe since the Bush senior administration. The Clinton administration did not have a foreign policy. In the George W. Bush administration, it was all Middle East, all the time. In the Obama administration, the Russian reset and the pivot towards Asia were basically just a little bit of window dressing to cover the fact that we were cancelling our Middle East policy. So, we have really not had a functional foreign policy in any meaningful sense of the term for twenty-five years. In my view, the two areas where it makes the most sense for the United States to engage in a constructive manner are Latin American, specifically Mexico, and Southeast Asia, specifically Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Myanmar and Vietnam. These are the parts of the world that have good demography and where a combination of local consumptive capacity could marry well with American technology and military policy. Anywhere else in the world, you are going to deal with collapsing demographies so there is no market to access. If you go to the Persian Gulf, you are going to be in the middle of a Saudi Arabian knife fight. If you go into Europe, you must deal with the Russian resurgence. If you go into East Asian, you must deal with what is brewing into a Japan/Korea/Taiwan/China fight. You do not have to deal with that in Southeast Asia. Half the population is under thirty. You do not have to deal with that with Mexico, which is already the U.S.’s number one or number two trade partner, depending on how you do the data. These two regions are easy. They do not have a lot of heartburn and they offer a lot in terms of resources and markets. High: Explain the basis of the global world order for the past 70 years. Zeihan: Before World War II, you did not trade with your neighbors if you could help it because any military conflict anywhere in the world could disrupt what were ganglion supply chains, even if you were not the target of a war. You kept everything in house, expanded into empire, and used your navy to protect your internal trade. World War II ultimately brought the whole system crashing down. Since the United States was the only country involved in the war that did not have fighting on its soil, it could impose a replacement system at Bretton Woods in 1944. Bretton Woods worked fundamentally differently. Instead of everybody having their own sequestered imperial economy, everything was put into a global bucket. Everyone who was represented at Bretton Woods could access that bucket for resources and markets. And the U.S. Navy guaranteed the security of the seas for absolutely everyone. This had never been attempted before. It worked for two reasons. One, the U.S. did the protecting; and two, the U.S., whose market survived the war, opened that market to all the allies and allowed them to export their way back to affluence. We did this not because we were nice, but because we were basically bribing an alliance. The catch of Bretton Woods was if you wanted all this access, you had to allow the United States to fight the Cold War its way. It started with the wartime allies and eventually expanded it to the Axis in the 1950’s—Latin American, Northern Europe, Scandinavians, we eventually brought in Southeast Asia—and by the time we got to the end of the Cold War, you had over half the global system as part of this network. The problem is that Americans were so impressed with the end of the Cold War that we picked a domestic candidate for the next six or seven elections. The free trade aspect of Bretton Woods was allowed to linger on while the security quid pro quo, which was the American justification for it in the first place, fell by the wayside. For the last twenty-five years, we have been backing away from that system. That has made the world a lot more chaotic and has allowed things like Syria, the Japanese financial crisis, and European financial crisis to happen. Had any of these things happened in the 1960’s or 1970’s, the United States would have stepped in with a massive financial and/or military involvement to stymie it. We are not doing that anymore so you have military conflicts around the world breaking out. Today, we are at the verge of American withdrawal from active management. The secondary powers that have had their economic security provided to them basically free of charge now must start looking after their own affairs. Most of them are not ready. Of those that are, they are not the kind of countries that we normally associate with ones that we want to be world leaders. The Russians are asserting influence into central Europe. That is going to provoke a response from Sweden and Germany, probably Turkey, too. The American withdrawal from the Persian Gulf leaves it up to the Iranians and the Saudis to duke it out over who is in charge. The oil price war over the last two years is just the opening round of that. Syria is a piece of that. The next stage is some sort of energy crisis triggered by either Saudi Arabia or Iran or Poland or Russia. If any of those four countries decide to use energy as a weapon, you are talking about a minimum of two million barrels of crude going off line, perhaps as much as twenty-five. Then you get an energy crisis, and that means that the Chinese and the Japanese have to fight for whatever cargos they can access. One way or another, the global system that we are all so used to—and that we just assume operates on autopilot—is going to break down. If Trump lives up to his rhetoric and his pullback is as aggressive as it looks like it is going to be, this next year is the year. High: There are three hypotheses highlighted in your book, The Accidental Superpower: the reassertion of geopolitics as the rule by which the world operates; global demographic inversions; and shale energy, which by making U.S. energy independent in many ways could be the lubricant of a lot what you have just described. Can you walk us through these three hypotheses and the importance of the U.S.’s position for the foreseeable future? Zeihan: First, geopolitics. Policy, culture, finance—everything is shaped by physical geography. Some countries have extreme advantages over others. If you have a lot of flat lands and rivers for natural transport corridors, it is very easy to develop and expand. The cost of moving goods on water is about one-twelfth of what it is on land. Countries like France or Germany or Japan or the United States have a massive leg up in their ability to generate financial, economic, industrial, and agricultural power. That translates into everything else that they do and makes them major military powers as well. Bretton Woods made that not matter because it put everybody in the same club. It told countries that they could not use military power to impress their will upon others. Free trade gave everybody access. Free movement of capital made the countries that were relatively capital poor, whether they are Brazil or India or Spain, the ability to function as strong secondary powers for the first time in history. All of these things in economic competition that had driven imperial competition for centuries were suddenly given for free. You remove Bretton Woods and it all starts up again. The Germans must start looking after their own interests. The Japanese cannot rely on the protection of the American Navy and freedom of the seas for their imports and exports. The Chinese, who were probably the biggest beneficiaries of Bretton Woods, actually have to go back to their 4,000 years of internal strife because they lack projection capacity. They are caged by their own geography. This story is going to repeat over and over across the world. All of those secondary powers that used to be major empires all of a sudden have to start acting imperial again. And that is going to generate everything from energy crises to famines to military conflicts. Number two is demography. People of different ages act differently. For those in their twenties and thirties, it is all about consumption. Their incomes are low; it is house loans, car loans, college loans. High growth, but high debt. For your mature workers in their 40's, 50's, and 60's, they are preparing for retirement and their incomes are very high. This is all the investment capital that makes the world move. This is the tax base. Young folks do the consuming. Older folks take care of the investment capital. Finally, once they retire they start drawing more from the system than they put in. Pensions and health care start to overwhelm their finances and that becomes a problem for governments. In a traditional demography, the elderly are the smallest group. The folks in the middle group are larger and the young workers make up the bulk. It is a pyramid. But with urbanization and the post-World War II experience, we have had a collapse in birth rate throughout most of the world and now the demography is completely inverted in a lot of the world: the big bulge in the demography is not the young worker but the mature worker who is socking away a lot of capital for retirement and paying huge taxes. By the time you get to 2022, the majority of the baby boomers will have retired, and they will take all that investment capital and all that tax money with them. Every government on the planet is going to have to get along with a lot less income while they have to dish out a lot more payment for the retirees. There is only one country in the world that is an exception to that: the United States, because we are the only place where the boomers actually had kids. We come out on the other end all right because the millennial generation is large and by the time they are in their 40's and 50's, our demographics will have more or less fixed themselves. That does not happen anywhere else. Everywhere else, the population gets older every year, the population gets less skilled every year, and financial costs go up every year. The European financial crisis, the Japanese financial crisis—these are as good as they will ever be right now. It is all downhill from here. While the United States is losing interest in maintaining the global system, at the same time the global structure breaks down, the United States is becoming the only market in the world. And it is going to be keeping to itself. That is a triple hit to every economy in the world. If you are a trade-based economy like Korea or China or Germany, you get hit from every possible angle at the same time. Number three is shale. It all comes down to full cycle breakeven prices: how much does it cost to get a barrel of crude on average out of the ground including everything from exploration on the front end, to production costs, to mid-stream piping, to taxes on the back end? In the big four shale fields in the United States, the breakeven price is about $40 per barrel. So U.S. shale—what we have always thought of as the really expensive stuff—is now cost-competitive with every energy basin in the world outside of the Persian Gulf itself. There is a whole suite of new technologies-- things like refracking and multi-lateral drilling, in-drilling, and water tanks—that are coming together to make a new best practices suite, merging with Big Data and that price structure is still going down. By the time we get to January 2019, we will probably be at about $25 per barrel. Because of that cost structure, you are seeing U.S. energy output increasing despite weak prices. Unless the bottom falls out of the oil markets and we go down to $20 per barrel, I see no reason for that to change. You will undoubtedly see North America achieving full energy independence within a couple of years and with a little tweak in the price structure by the end of this term, it is entirely possible that not just North America will be energy-independent, but the United States itself might be very close.

#### Economic decline risks a breakdown of international institutions—that causes war

* 1930s prove that prolonged global downturn has geopolitical repercussions in the US and Europe
* Brings about trade wars and competition over resources,
* Hurts international institutions like EU and WT
* Tensions are rising now

**Kreitner 11** [Ricky Kreitner (intern at Business Insider). “Serious People Are Starting To Realize That We May Be Looking At World War III.” Business Insider. August 8th, 2011. <http://www.businessinsider.com/serious-people-are-starting-to-realize-that-we-may-be-looking-at-world-war-iii-2011-8>]

Noting liberal despair over the government's inability to combat economic depression, and conservative skepticism that traditional tools will be effective, John Judis of The New Republic argues that a global depression far longer and more severe than anyone expected now seems nearly impossible to avoid. Judis believes that the coming "depression" will be accompanied by **geopolitical upheaval and institutional collapse**. "As the experience of the 1930s testified, a prolonged global downturn can have profound political and **geopolitical repercussions**. In the U.S. and Europe, the downturn has already inspired unsavory, right-wing populist movements. It could also bring about **trade wars** and intense **competition over natural resources**, and the eventual breakdown of important institutions like European Union and the World Trade Organization. **Even a shooting war is possible**." Daniel Knowles of the Telegraph has noticed a similar trend. In a post titled, "This Really Is Beginning To Look Like 1931," Knowles argues that we could be witnessing the transition from recession to global depression that last occurred two years after the 1929 market collapse, and eight years before Germany invaded Poland, triggering the Second World War: "The difference today is that so far, the chain reaction of a default has been avoided by bailouts. Countries are not closing down their borders or arming their soldiers – they can agree on some solution, if not a good solution. But the fundamental problem – the spiral downwards caused by confidence crises and ever rising interest rates – is exactly the same now as it was in 1931. And as Italy and Spain come under attack, we are reaching the limit of how much that sticking plaster can heal. Tensions between European countries unseen in decades are emerging." Knowles wrote that post three days ago. Since then it has become abundantly obvious that Europe will soon become unwilling or unable to continue bailing out every country with a debt problem. Meanwhile, the U.S. economy continues to chug along, to the extent it is chugging at all, on the false security offered

#### That’s the most probable scenario for war

* Cooperation has increasily been less likely to work in multiple empirical examples i.e. 1990s,
* Most likely to cause economic crises

**Elhefnawy 11** [Nader Elhefnawy (professor of English at the University of Miami, writer on IR published in peer-reviewed journals including International Security, Astropolitics, and Survival). “Twenty Years After the Cold War: A Strategic Survey,” Parameters, The U.S. Army War College Quarterly. Spring 2011. <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2011spring/Ehlefnawy.pdf>]

Relative calm has prevailed among the great powers since the demise of the Soviet Union. Large-scale warfare remains a possibility, but by and large interstate war has been confined to the margins of the international system, and limited in its intensity, with the operational realities of the world’s major armed forces characterized by alternative missions. Neoliberal globalization has been robust but economically problematic, characterized by slow growth, financial instability, and other factors contributing to social and political stress. East Asia, and especially China, constituted the principal exception to the slow growth characterizing these decades. East Asia has massively increased its share of world manufacturing, exports, and exchange reserves, while at the same time the EU expanded and consolidated the continent’s resources, with some “game-changing” implications (like the euro). Additionally, rising commodity prices have resulted in booms among resource exporters, particularly energy exporters, which have also permitted these nations to enjoy greater political leverage.¶ As a result, while the United States remains in a class of its own with regard to military power, and its large national market, there have been some substantial shifts in economic power from the United States and Japan to other actors over the past two decades. This is particularly true of China, the EU, and a select number of energy exporters, resulting in a more complex and diffuse distribution of power. At the same time the relationships of the major powers are less defined by concerns related to traditional, state-centered threats than at any time since the nineteenth century, if not earlier. While these may not be the traditional threats, they do present an unprecedented array of non-traditional security concerns in areas like energy, the environment, and finance, and physical threats presented by non-state actors, such as international terrorism and high-seas piracy. Despite these mounting threats, cooperation has consistently fallen short of the levels hoped for in the early 1990s.¶ Many of the current trends seem likely to continue through the foreseeable future. The interaction of the crises of the past several years (especially in energy and international finance) combined with long-mounting stresses in the global economy (slow growth, debt, ecological pressure) all raise the possibility of changes in some areas of development, particularly if these changes impact the world’s three principal loci of economic power: China, the European Union, and the United States. China may continue to grow rapidly, though perhaps less so as it matures, and begins to pursue goals beyond the mere maximizing of GDP. Even if the EU’s attempts at integration and expansion recede (as is plausible), Europe as a whole is likely to remain powerful, even if that power is less extensive and well-organized.¶ Meanwhile the US position is not unlike what the “declinists” of the 1980s and early 1990s anticipated. The most significant direct challenges to the United States some twenty years after the Cold War are not military, but economic: deindustrialization, balance of payments problems, debt, and surviving inside an ever-more integrated global economy and strained ecosystem. Relations among the great powers may yet grow more intense, but **economic crisis seems the most likely cause of any future conflict,** with the less traditional dimensions of security presenting the most realistic obstacles to the United States’ freedom of action if such events ever do materialize.

#### Economic collapse causes competition for resources and instability that escalates and goes nuclear

- Terrorist appeals will decline, groups in 2025 will be descendants of long established groups, that become self- radicalized in the absence of economic outlets.

- close proximity nuclear rivals will produce inherent difficulties.

- less cooperation increases and pushes tensions over the bwrik

- cooperation manages resources and dincreasingly differnet

Harris and Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf> Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions**.** It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### 2- NSA

#### Advantage 2 is the NSA

#### Campus censorship spills over and perpetuates serious invasions of freedom—that includes NSA surveillance

**Silverglate 13** [Harvey Silverglate (I practice law -- criminal defense, civil liberties, and academic freedom/student rights cases. I'm a four-decade columnist and contributor to the Boston Phoenix, an alternative weekly, as well as an occasional contributor to The National Law Journal, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, The Wall Street Journal, The Boston Globe, and elsewhere). “Campus Censorship Breeds Societal Dysfunction.” Forbes. January 16th, 2013. http://www.forbes.com/sites/harveysilverglate/2013/01/16/campus-censorship-breeds-societal-dysfunction/#51f21f847d1c]

Lukianoff posits that the pervasive trend of campus censorship has had a wider effect on our society as a whole. He persuasively argues that, in short, we are entering an era of our own creation where the anti-liberty culture in Harvard Yard (part of the university) is dictating a similarly unfree culture in Harvard Square (part of the City of Cambridge). After all, we educate the next generation of leaders on these campuses. From this perspective, contemporary campuses can be seen essentially as incubators for a future society governed by censorship of iconoclastic ideas and kangaroo courts that enforce those prohibitions. As Lukianoff’s title suggests, “campus censorship” produces, as students are sent out into the real world, an “end of American debate” that disrupts the gears and self-correcting mechanisms so essential for the functioning of our free society. This set off a little light bulb in my head. As regular readers of “Injustice Department” know, I wrote a book of my own in 2009 titled Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent, in which I describe how the U.S. Department of Justice prosecutes an alarming number of innocent people, using statutes so vague they are essentially incomprehensible. In Three Felonies, as in “Injustice Department,” I describe the “what” but do not much attempt to explain the “why.” Unlearning Liberty gave me surprising insight into how it could be that such a large number of graduates of some of the nation’s leading colleges and law schools wind up as U.S. Department of Justice prosecutors doing so many awful things to so many often innocent people. I likewise gained insight into how some of the sharper legal minds now sitting on the federal bench do not blanch when innocent citizens are convicted of violating statutes and regulations that no normal person could possibly understand. Students, who get accustomed to the administrative tyranny that marks the vast majority of colleges, universities and graduate schools today, don’t have much adjusting to do when they gain, and abuse, real power of their own in the nation at large, including in its legislative chambers, executive offices, and courts. An understanding of campus speech codes elucidates why undefined federal “mail fraud” statutes (the use of the mails to facilitate the commission of fraudulent activity, which is often undefined itself) do not strike either legislators or judges as unconstitutionally vague (that is, they do not give adequately clear warning as to what conduct is criminal). Legislators and judges have, after all, been to college. And those who have more recently graduated are more likely than their predecessors to buy into the notion that real and legitimate violations are stated in such codes. “Harassment” on campus is the equivalent of “mail fraud” out in the real world. And Unlearning Liberty helps explain the insufficient concern out in the real world at the increasingly invasive investigatory practices carried out on American citizens by such agencies as the FBI and the CIA. For instance, we have seen few, if any, credible primary challenges of senators and congressmen (on both sides of the aisle) who vote every year to reauthorize the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), despite its provisions authorizing the indefinite detention of American citizens. Nor have there been any repercussions whatsoever stemming from the National Security Administration’s warrantless wiretapping program that began under the Bush administration—an extension of which was signed into law by President Obama last month. The law, as one friend of mine puts it, has become “silly putty,” and few have noticed the implications for both education and freedom. Lukianoff makes the point persuasively and in great detail that our institutions of higher learning are destroying our students’ sense of critical thinking and devotion to liberty—a phenomenon that translates into dysfunction in our society at large.

#### NSA surveillance undermines Internet security and global trust in the Internet

**Zetter 14** [Kim Zetter (award-winning, senior staff reporter at Wired covering cybercrime, privacy, and security). “Personal Privacy Is Only One of the Costs of NSA Surveillance.” Wired. July 29th, 2014. <https://www.wired.com/2014/07/the-big-costs-of-nsa-surveillance-that-no-ones-talking-about/>]

Deterioration of Cybersecurity Out of all the revelations to come to light in the past year, the most shocking may well be the NSA’s persistent campaign to undermine encryption, install backdoors in hardware and software and amass a stockpile of zero-day vulnerabilities and exploits. “For the past decade, N.S.A. has led an aggressive, multipronged effort to break widely used Internet encryption technologies,” according to a 2010 memo from Government Communications Headquarters, the NSA’s counterpart in the UK, leaked by Edward Snowden. Furthermore, a story from Pro Publica noted, the NSA “actively engages the US and foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly leverage their commercial products’ designs” to make them more amenable to the NSA’s data collection programs and more susceptible to exploitation by the spy agency. The NSA, with help from the CIA and FBI, also has intercepted network routers from US manufacturers like Cisco to install spy tools before they’re shipped to overseas buyers, further undermining customer trust in US companies. Cisco senior vice president Mark Chandler wrote in a company blog post that his and other companies ought to be able to count on the government not interfering “with the lawful delivery of our products in the form in which we have manufactured them. To do otherwise, and to violate legitimate privacy rights of individuals and institutions around the world, undermines confidence in our industry.” All of these activities are at direct odds with the Obama administration’s stated goal of securing the internet and critical infrastructure and undermine global trust in the internet and the safety of communications. The actions are particularly troubling because the insertion of backdoors and vulnerabilities in systems doesn’t just undermine them for exploitation by the NSA but makes them more susceptible for exploitation by other governments as well as by criminal hackers. “The existence of these programs, in addition to undermining confidence in the internet industry, creates real security concerns,” the authors of the report note.

#### Destruction of the Internet causes extinction

**Eagleman 10** [David Eagleman (neuroscientist at Baylor College of Medicine, where he directs the Laboratory for Perception and Action and the Initiative on Neuroscience and Law and author of Sum (Canongate)). “Six ways the internet will save civilization.” Wired. Nov. 9, 2010. <http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2010/12/start/apocalypse-no>]

Many great civilisations have fallen, leaving nothing but cracked ruins and scattered genetics. Usually this results from: natural disasters, resource depletion, economic meltdown, disease, poor information flow and corruption. But we’re luckier than our predecessors because we command a technology that no one else possessed: a rapid communication network that finds its highest expression in the internet. I propose that there are six ways in which the net has vastly reduced the threat of societal collapse. Epidemics can be deflected by telepresence One of our more dire prospects for collapse is an infectious-disease epidemic. Viral and bacterial epidemics precipitated the fall of the Golden Age of Athens, the Roman Empire and most of the empires of the Native Americans. The internet can be our key to survival because the ability to work telepresently can inhibit microbial transmission by reducing human-to-human contact. In the face of an otherwise devastating epidemic, businesses can keep supply chains running with the maximum number of employees working from home. This can reduce host density below the tipping point required for an epidemic. If we are well prepared when an epidemic arrives, we can fluidly shift into a self-quarantined society in which microbes fail due to host scarcity. Whatever the social ills of isolation, they are worse for the microbes than for us. The internet will predict natural disasters We are witnessing the downfall of slow central control in the media: news stories are increasingly becoming user-generated nets of up-to-the-minute information. During the recent California wildfires, locals went to the TV stations to learn whether their neighbourhoods were in danger. But the news stations appeared most concerned with the fate of celebrity mansions, so Californians changed their tack: they uploaded geotagged mobile-phone pictures, updated Facebook statuses and tweeted. The balance tipped: the internet carried news about the fire more quickly and accurately than any news station could. In this grass-roots, decentralised scheme, there were embedded reporters on every block, and the news shockwave kept ahead of the fire. This head start could provide the extra hours that save us. If the Pompeiians had had the internet in 79AD, they could have easily marched 10km to safety, well ahead of the pyroclastic flow from Mount Vesuvius. If the Indian Ocean had the Pacific’s networked tsunami-warning system, South-East Asia would look quite different today. Discoveries are retained and shared Historically, critical information has required constant rediscovery. Collections of learning -- from the library at Alexandria to the entire Minoan civilisation -- have fallen to the bonfires of invaders or the wrecking ball of natural disaster. Knowledge is hard won but easily lost. And information that survives often does not spread. Consider smallpox inoculation: this was under way in India, China and Africa centuries before it made its way to Europe. By the time the idea reached North America, native civilisations who needed it had already collapsed. The net solved the problem. New discoveries catch on immediately; information spreads widely. In this way, societies can optimally ratchet up, using the latest bricks of knowledge in their fortification against risk. Tyranny is mitigated Censorship of ideas was a familiar spectre in the last century, with state-approved news outlets ruling the press, airwaves and copying machines in the USSR, Romania, Cuba, China, Iraq and elsewhere. In many cases, such as Lysenko’s agricultural despotism in the USSR, it directly contributed to the collapse of the nation. Historically, a more successful strategy has been to confront free speech with free speech -- and the internet allows this in a natural way. It democratises the flow of information by offering access to the newspapers of the world, the photographers of every nation, the bloggers of every political stripe. Some posts are full of doctoring and dishonesty whereas others strive for independence and impartiality -- but all are available to us to sift through. Given the attempts by some governments to build firewalls, it’s clear that this benefit of the net requires constant vigilance. Human capital is vastly increased Crowdsourcing brings people together to solve problems. Yet far fewer than one per cent of the world’s population is involved. We need expand human capital. Most of the world not have access to the education afforded a small minority. For every Albert Einstein, Yo-Yo Ma or Barack Obama who has educational opportunities, uncountable others do not. This squandering of talent translates into reduced economic output and a smaller pool of problem solvers. The net opens the gates education to anyone with a computer. A motivated teen anywhere on the planet can walk through the world’s knowledge -- from the webs of Wikipedia to the curriculum of MIT’s OpenCourseWare. The new human capital will serve us well when we confront existential threats we’ve never imagined before. Energy expenditure is reduced Societal collapse can often be understood in terms of an energy budget: when energy spend outweighs energy return, collapse ensues. This has taken the form of deforestation or soil erosion; currently, the worry involves fossil-fuel depletion. The internet addresses the energy problem with a natural ease. Consider the massive energy savings inherent in the shift from paper to electrons -- as seen in the transition from the post to email. Ecommerce reduces the need to drive long distances to purchase products. Delivery trucks are more eco-friendly than individuals driving around, not least because of tight packaging and optimisation algorithms for driving routes. Of course, there are energy costs to the banks of computers that underpin the internet -- but these costs are less than the wood, coal and oil that would be expended for the same quantity of information flow. The tangle of events that triggers societal collapse can be complex, and there are several threats the net does not address. But vast, networked communication can be an antidote to several of the most deadly diseases threatening civilisation. The next time your coworker laments internet addiction, the banality of tweeting or the decline of face-to-face conversation, you may want to suggest that the net may just be the technology that saves us.

#### NSA surveillance also kills US leadership on Internet freedom

**Zetter 14** [Kim Zetter (award-winning, senior staff reporter at Wired covering cybercrime, privacy, and security). “Personal Privacy Is Only One of the Costs of NSA Surveillance.” Wired. July 29th, 2014. <https://www.wired.com/2014/07/the-big-costs-of-nsa-surveillance-that-no-ones-talking-about/>]

Undermining U.S. Support for Internet Freedom Finally, the NSA’s spying activities have greatly undermined the government’s policies in support of internet freedom around the world and its work in advocating for freedom of expression and combating censorship and oppression. “As the birthplace for so many of these technologies, including the internet itself, we have a responsibility to see them used for good,” then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a 2010 speech launching a campaign in support of internet freedom. But while “the US government promotes free expression abroad and aims to prevent repressive governments from monitoring and censoring their citizens,” the New American report notes, it is “simultaneously supporting domestic laws that authorize surveillance and bulk data collection.” The widespread collection of data, which has a chilling effect on freedom of expression, is precisely the kind of activity for which the U.S. condemns other countries. This hypocrisy has opened a door for repressive regimes to question the US role in internet governance bodies and has allowed them to argue in favor of their own governments having greater control over the internet. At the UN Human Rights Council in September 2013, the report notes, a representative from Pakistan—speaking on behalf of Cuba, Iran, China and other countries—said the surveillance programs highlighted the need for their nations to have a greater role in governing the internet.

#### US promotion of Internet freedom is key to human rights

**Posner 11** [Michael Posner (assistant secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor). “Internet Freedom and Human Rights: The Obama Administration’s Perspective.” U.S. Department of State. July 13th, 2011. https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2011/168475.htm]

But this is not just about technology. Secretary Clinton has put Internet freedom on the map as a key diplomatic priority, in our bilateral relationships and in multilateral institutions, including the UN Human Rights Council, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which just held a ministerial on these issues a few weeks ago, and others. Many of you here today have urged us to not view Internet freedom in isolation, but to wrestle with the challenge of integrating Internet freedom with national security, combating cyber crime, protecting intellectual property, and other vital interests. This is what we’ve done in President Obama’s International Strategy for Cyberspace, which incorporates all of these legitimate interests. This is the hard part – it’s where Americans disagree not only with repressive governments but amongst ourselves. But we all agree on the importance of getting it right. By now, every government understands the power of ordinary citizens to harness the Internet and social media to organize and express themselves. Some have embraced these new technologies as a way to connect with and serve their citizens. Others are redoubling their attempts to control them. We are seeing the development of more sophisticated tools for cyber-repression, including filtering, surveillance, anti-circumvention, and network-disabling technologies by government security forces in closed societies. We’re also witnessing the rise of cyber attacks on the computers of independent media, Distributed Denial of Service attacks on the sites of watchdog groups, and other attempts to thwart the work of civil society. Before I joined this administration, I spent 30 years working on human rights issues from the low-tech NGO side. So today I want to refocus attention not on the technologies to fight Internet repression, but on the psychology of the repressors. What causes a regime to perceive the Internet as such a profound threat that it is willing to damage its country’s economy by choking bandwidth, blocking content or even shutting down the network entirely? These are the acts of governments that fear their own people. In cracking down on the Internet, they expose their own lack of legitimacy. But these crackdowns also indicate a basic lack of understanding that free speech – whether it’s supportive speech or subversive speech – is harder than ever to suppress in the Digital Age. And the young people who have taken to the streets across the Arab world this year understand that it isn’t pornography or pirating that is being suppressed. It’s people. It’s their demands for dignity and a say in the political and economic future of their countries. After all, Facebook does not foment dissent; people do. Twitter only amplifies those voices that have the most resonance, those ideas that people find most powerful. As President Obama said in a speech in Cairo in June 2009 -- 19 months before the protests in Tahrir Square -- “Suppressing ideas never succeeds in making them go away.” Two billion people now have access to the Internet. That’s a lot of speech to try to suppress. In the next 20 years, nearly 5 billion more people will come online. Will they be joining a true global conversation over a single, unified global network? Or will they be entering a stilted alternative reality of government-approved content on controlled national intranets? This is the vision of the “halal” Internet being advocated by some in Iran, a course that would only deepen the country’s isolation and the Iranian authorities’ estrangement from their own citizens. So let’s be honest: Governments that respect the rights of their citizens have no reason to fear a free Internet. The Internet didn’t topple the governments of Tunisia or Egypt; their people did. But smart governments are using social media tools to better communicate with and understand their own people -- and to deliver services in a more open and accountable fashion. And they are recognizing that free access to tech tools spurs both social and economic progress. If you really want to address popular discontent, you don’t need an army of censors deleting posts on social media sites. You need a cadre of government officials reading those posts and figuring out how to identify and address the legitimate grievances that are being expressed there. So don’t shoot the instant messenger! Instead, address the underlying grievances -- the corruption, the abuse of power, the environmental degradation, the lack of political and economic opportunity, the daily affronts to dignity by indifferent authorities. More than anything else, it is this quest for dignity that has prompted so many young people to walk away from their keyboards and into the streets to demand a chance to build a better future. And it is their vision of the future that matters. This administration is working to support them. Our work on Internet freedom is not about messaging; it’s about empowerment. It is up to all the people of each country to build societies in which governments respect not some rights part of the time, but all of the rights of the governed, every day. The role of the international community is to offer support -- technological and institutional. Your generation – the digital natives -- has developed new tools with unprecedented potential to empower people around the world to participate in a truly democratic process. The world is eager to see what you will invent next. But we’re equally eager for your help in forging international consensus and setting the expectations needed to support Internet freedom. It will be up to your generation to make this vision a reality for the 5 billion users – by setting the rules of the road on the Internet for the 21st century. The human challenge of Internet freedom is to use technological tools to build a different kind of relationship between citizens, civil society and their governments -- a relationship based not merely upon the consent of the governed, but upon broad participation in governance by all citizens. With your help, we will continue to put U.S. diplomatic power behind that vision of a more inclusive, peaceful and democratic world.

#### Promoting human rights norms solves war and nuclear proliferation

**Burke-White 4** [William W. Burke-White (Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University and Ph.D. at Cambridge). “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation.” The Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, Lexis. 2004.]

This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period [\*250] indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also those **most likely to engage in aggression**. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records decrease the **likelihood of aggressive war**, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and **global security**. Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. 2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.

#### Prolif causes extinction

**Kroenig 15** [Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council, “THE HISTORY OF PROLIFERATION OPTIMISM: DOES IT HAVE A FUTURE?” <http://www.npolicy.org/books/Moving_Beyond_Pretense/Ch3_Kroenig.pdf>]

WHY **NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IS A PROBLEM** The spread of **nuc**lear weapon**s** poses a number of **severe threats** to international peace and U.S. national security, including **nuclear war**, **nuclear terrorism**, **global and regional instability**, **constrained freedom of action**, **weakened alliances**, and **further nuclear proliferation.** This section explores each of these threats in turn. Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is **nuclear war**. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between the two superpowers during the Cold War could have arguably resulted in **human extinction**, and a nuclear exchange between states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, could still result in **millions of deaths** and casualties, billions of dollars of **economic devastation, environmental degradation**, and a parade of other horrors. 71 To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus year tradition of nuclear nonuse as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dotcom bubble bursting in the late-1990s and the Great Recession of late-2000s.53 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in my lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a **transition period** in which they **lack a secure second-strike capability**. In this context, one or both states might believe that it **has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first**. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike 72 to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities and eliminate the threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, **might feel “use ‘em or loose ‘em” pressures**. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the **reciprocal fear of surprise attack**.54 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that **war is inevitable** and that it would be **better to go first than to go second**. In a future Israel-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. **Even in** a world of **MAD, there is a risk of nuclear war.** Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. For example, Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who genuinely hold millenarian religious worldviews and who could one day ascend to power and have their finger on the nuclear trigger. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. 73 One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine a nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As discussed previously, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest, and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. This leads to the credibility problem that is at the heart of modern deterrence theory: How can you credibly threaten to attack a nuclear-armed opponent? Deterrence theorists have devised at least two answers to this question. First, as stated earlier, leaders can choose to launch a limited nuclear war.55 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional military inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the **U**nited **S**tates was willing to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, given NATO’s conventional inferiority. As Russia’s conventional military power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) **as a way to de-escalate a crisis**. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. Finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. **Second**, as was also discussed earlier, leaders can **make a “threat that leaves something to chance**.”56 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can **increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down**. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. Scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents could have led to war.57 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, meaning that there is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.

### 3- Solvency

#### Plan Text: Resolved- Public colleges and universities in the United States should adopt policies on freedom of speech modeled on Yale University’s Woodward Report of 1974.

#### The plan effectively restores free speech and intellectual freedom on campuses

**Kurtz 15** [Stanley Kurtz (graduated from Haverford College and holds a Ph.D. in social anthropology from Harvard University. He did his field work in India and taught at Harvard and the University of Chicago). “A Plan to Restore Free Speech on Campus.” National Review. December 7th, 2015. <http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/428122/plan-restore-free-speech-campus-stanley-kurtz>]

Many of the proposals listed below can be mandated for public universities by state legislatures. These proposals can also galvanize student activism on campuses across the country, as well as activism by faculty, parents, alumni, administrators, trustees, and citizens. Alumni can press their alma maters to adopt these proposals, on pain of losing donations. Citizens can press their state legislators to adopt these proposals, on pain of losing votes. Here is the program: First: Colleges and universities ought to adopt a policy on freedom of expression modeled on Yale’s Woodward Report of 1974, which identifies ensuring intellectual freedom in the pursuit of knowledge as the primary obligation of a university. While the Woodward Report forthrightly acknowledges the importance of solidarity, harmony, civility, and mutual respect to campus life, it unmistakably marks these values as subordinate in priority to freedom of expression. In accordance with this, the Woodward Report rejects the proposition that members of an academic community are entitled to suppress speech they regard as offensive. Of course, within a university, the need for intellectual freedom is in the service of the pursuit of knowledge. Freedom of expression is a critical consideration, yet does not in itself fully resolve issues like the structure of the college curriculum. That said, the Woodward Report can and should serve as a model for statements on free expression at our colleges and universities. Once adopted, new statements on freedom of expression would supersede and replace any pre-existing speech codes. Second: Colleges and universities need to systematically educate members of their community in the principles of free expression. The central theme of freshman orientation, for example, ought to turn around the primacy of free speech. Many colleges and universities now assign incoming freshman a “common reading” to complete over the summer before entering school. During freshman year, colleges organize seminars and guest-lectures around that reading. The National Association of Scholars has reported on the thin and tendentious nature of many common reading selections, and I have commented on their politicization. As an antidote to such problems, colleges should consider assigning John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty as a common reading for entering freshmen. Responding to threats to intellectual freedom at Princeton, a student group, the Princeton Open Campus Coalition, recently called for bringing more representatives of seldom-heard viewpoints to campus. Inviting outside speakers to address John Stuart Mill’s argument for liberty of thought and discussion during freshman orientation would be an easy way to draw unconventional voices to campus. At every level of the university, efforts should be made to invite both outsiders and insiders to study, discuss, and debate the scope and meaning of free speech. Political philosopher Peter Berkowitz recently floated the idea of establishing university centers for the study and practice of free speech. These centers would “foster an understanding of free speech and its indissoluble connection with liberal education.” The founding of such centers on our campuses should become a priority. Third: “A university administration’s responsibility for assuring free expression imposes further obligations: it must act firmly when a speech is disrupted or when disruption is attempted; it must undertake to identify disruptors, and it must make known its intentions to do so beforehand.” The above passage is from Yale’s Woodward Report. Although the Woodward Report is official university policy at Yale, some of its central recommendations are apparently not being taken seriously. Consider the recent controversy over freedom of speech at Yale, where a student had to be dragged out of a lecture hall by a police officer after disrupting the William F. Buckley, Jr. Program’s conference on free speech (video here). The conduct of this student would appear to be a violation of Yale’s Undergraduate Regulations on “peaceful dissent, protests, and demonstrations” (derived from the Woodward Report), which bar any member of the University community from preventing “the orderly conduct of a University function or activity, such as a lecture, meeting…or other public event,” on pain of potential suspension or expulsion. If Yale’s regulations were being properly enforced, this student would have faced a disciplinary hearing. Ultimately, if the facts turned out to be as they appear from the video and published reports, some sort of discipline would result — at minimum, a warning that any further such actions would bring certain suspension or expulsion. To all appearances, no such discipline has taken place. And appearances are important, because a core recommendation of the Woodward Report is that in order to serve as effective deterrents to further violations, sanctions for disruption of speech must be publicized. (I have submitted a series of questions to Yale’s administration on disciplinary proceedings related to the disruption at the Buckley Program conference on free speech, and will report when I receive a reply.) We take it for granted nowadays that conduct like this student’s disruption of the Yale free-speech conference — and conduct far worse — entails no consequences for students. If we are to restore free speech to our campuses, that needs to change. In the absence of a deeper understanding of the principles of free expression, discipline alone will not be effective. Yet in combination with broader education in the principles of intellectual freedom, discipline for interference with campus speech can be very effective indeed. We will not see freedom of speech on our campuses until disruptors face discipline for silencing, or attempting to silence, others. Fourth: College and university trustees must monitor administrators to ensure that they promote and defend freedom of expression. Thomas D. Klingenstein, chairman of the board of the Claremont Institute, recently suggested that college and university trustees establish a board-level standing committee on free expression (COFE), and provide that committee with staff and considerable independence. A university COFE could act as a check on the reluctance of college administrators to court student displeasure by enforcing rules against disruption of speech. For public universities, state legislatures could receive and act on reports from a system-wide COFE. The public should also take an interest in COFE reports. Fifth: Colleges and universities ought to adopt policies on institutional political neutrality based on the University of Chicago’s Kalven Committee Report of 1967. The Kalven Report explains that the ability of a university to foster political dissent and criticism by faculty and students actually depends upon the political neutrality of the institution itself. The principles of academic freedom and institutional neutrality embodied in the Kalven Report are the surest antidote to demands that universities divest themselves of stock in fossil-fuel providers, Israeli companies, and other political targets. Advocates who attempt to inject universities into the political process by means of their endowments substantially inhibit the intellectual freedom of faculty and students who wish to explore contrary points of view. The National Association of Scholars’ recent reports on campus sustainability and fossil-fuel divestment detail the illiberal implications of these movements. The American Council of Trustees and Alumni includes the text of the Kalven Report and an excellent commentary by civil libertarian attorney Harvey Silverglate in its guide to academic freedom. Trustees should take note. \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* Designing a program to restore free speech to our campuses is not difficult. The steps outlined above — most of them drawn from widely respected reports issued by major universities — would go a long way toward solving the problem. The difficulty is finding the political will and the levers of influence to take these steps when faculty and administrators have forgotten, abandoned, or turned against liberal ideals. Widespread public support for the proposals above, matched by action in state legislatures and an active movement of students on campus, represents the best hope of overcoming these obstacles.

# 1AR- Impacts

## AT: Prolif

### XT: Kroenig- ev

#### Prefer this evidence:

#### A. Expert Consensus- our author is a security expert who is the chair of IR at the nation's premier IR institute- experts are better than analytic specific args because they take into account every factor

#### B. 2015- recency, conducts analysis of over 80 years of war studies

#### C. Our evidence prices in alternate factors and their evidence and stil concludes aff

### AT: MAD

#### 1. Probability- more states with weapons increases scenarios for war which is comparitively more than a non-nuclear state

#### 2. Some states lack second strike capability- their competitors would strike before they've built an opportunity to strike back. (Iran-Israel example)

#### A. States with a nuclear advantage would be able to disarm their competitors in a devastating first attack

#### B. States with vulnerable nuclear arsenals would believe in a try-die scenario against larger competitors that they'd try to stop their competitor before they had the opportunity to fire

#### C. States could miscalculate surprise attacks and would just fire first believing in preemption

#### <Their evidence doesn't account for nuclear competitors with smaller states and bigger states>

#### 3. Even if they win that we could reach a safe state of MAD- their is still high possibility of war

#### A. They assume that all leaders are rational

#### B. Threats can be miscalculated

## AT: Dedev

### 1AR- Overview

#### Case outweighs on timeframe—warming takes too long, whereas collapse causes nuclear war in the short-term—that’s the aff—this risks extinction and precludes sustainable local communities

### 1AR- Diversionary War

**Best empirical evidence finds strong support for diversionary war theory**

**Baggott 14** (Erin Baggott, doctoral candidate at the Harvard University Department of Government. “Diversionary Cheap Talk: Domestic Discontent and US Foreign Policy, 1945-2006” International Studies Association Conference, Toronto March 28, 2014 http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/Toronto%202014/Archive/c9b89cda-5ebd-477f-86fb-c511dd8b9799.pdf) swap

In addition to advancing the theoretical literature on diversionary war, this paper tests these hypotheses with far better data than previously available. The new data for this paper consists of over 30,000 US diplomatic events between 1945 and 2006 drawn from a new corpus of all New York Times articles on foreign affairs over this period. Events are classified into 20 specific types (such as praise, threaten, or coerce) and four aggregate categories (material cooperation, verbal cooperation, verbal conflict, and material conflict). Verbal actions are those that occur in speech only (such as appeals or rejections) while material actions are those that involve physical action (such as the provision of aid or the exhibition of force posture). This represents the **most detailed and comprehensive event dataset** for this period. Its granularity allows for a better examination of domestic coalitional effects, and for an examination of diversionary cheap talk for the first time. Though other datasets like Militarized Interstate Disputes 3.0 under the Correlates of War project11 have greater historical range, they are censored in the sense that they only contain major events. While other day-level international relations event datasets exist, most notably King and Lowe (2003), they lack historical breadth, with most extending back only into the 1990s. Therefore, this new dataset is an advance in terms of detail and range. Modeling choices include fixed effects regression and Bayesian vector autoregression. I find **strong empirical support** for the theories outlined above. For Democratic administrations, a one percentage point increase in unemployment is associated with 12.85% more verbal conflicts per month than the baseline average (significant at the 1% level), but no more material conflicts. Unified government is associated with over 25% more verbal and material conflicts per month than divided government for both Democratic and Republican administrations (significant at the 1% level). Throughout, the estimates presented in this paper are conservative: I operationalize conflict as events the United States participated in, but if the sample is restricted to international events the United States **initiated**, the point estimates are larger and the statistical significance greater. This paper examines only the US case due to the wealth of data available on events, economic conditions, and public opinion ratings. However, future studies might broaden the analysis to OECD countries more generally. The broadest inference—that elected leaders verbally divert abroad to satisfy their core domestic constituency through rally around the flag effects, while avoiding paying the costs of war—should have theoretical traction in all democratic party systems. In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 reviews the literature, Section 3 advances a theory of diversionary behavior, Section 4 introduces the data, Section 5 presents the empirical analysis, and Section 6 concludes 2 Existing Literature Testing the diversionary aggression hypothesis has become somewhat of a cottage industry in political science. A recent review concludes that though the internal logic of diversionary war is “compelling and theoretically well supported,” the empirical evidence is “decidedly mixed.”12 Several studies have found **empirical support** for diversionary aggression in US foreign policy.13 A commonly cited example is President Reagan’s 1983 invasion of Grenada following the incident in Lebanon in which 200 Marines were killed. Other incidents that have raised scholarly interest are President Clinton’s strikes in **Serbia**, **Sudan**, and **Afghanistan** in 1998 and 1999 concurrent with his impeachment scandal.14 Other studies have found support for diversionary aggression in non-US and cross-national contexts.

### 1AR - Warming

#### No impact for a century — IPCC agrees.

**Ridley 15** — Matt Ridley, Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature and of the Academy of Medical Sciences, Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Conservative Member of the House of Lords (UK), Author of several popular science books including The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves and The Evolution of Everything: How Ideas Emerge, former Science Editor at The Economist, former Visiting Professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in New York, holds a D.Phil. in Zoology from Magdalen College, Oxford, 2015 (“Climate Change Will Not Be Dangerous for a Long Time,” Scientific American, November 27th, Available Online at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/climate-change-will-not-be-dangerous-for-a-long-time/, Accessed 07-17-2016)

The climate change debate has been polarized into a simple dichotomy. Either global warming is “real, man-made and dangerous,” as Pres. Barack Obama thinks, or it’s a “hoax,” as Oklahoma Sen. James Inhofe thinks. But there is a third possibility: that it is real, man-made and not dangerous, at least not for a long time. This “lukewarm” option has been boosted by recent climate research, and if it is right, current policies may do more harm than good. For example, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and other bodies agree that the rush to grow biofuels, justified as a decarbonization measure, has raised food prices and contributed to rainforest destruction. Since 2013 aid agencies such as the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the World Bank and the European Investment Bank have restricted funding for building fossil-fuel plants in Asia and Africa; that has slowed progress in bringing electricity to the one billion people who live without it and the four million who die each year from the effects of cooking over wood fires. In 1990 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was predicting that if emissions rose in a “business as usual” way, which they have done, then global average temperature would rise at the rate of about 0.3 degree Celsius per decade (with an uncertainty range of 0.2 to 0.5 degree C per decade). In the 25 years since, temperature has risen at about 0.1 to 0.2 degree C per decade, depending on whether surface or satellite data is used. The IPCC, in its most recent assessment report, lowered its near-term forecast for the global mean surface temperature over the period 2016 to 2035 to just 0.3 to 0.7 degree C above the 1986–2005 level. That is a warming of 0.1 to 0.2 degree C per decade, in all scenarios, including the high-emissions ones. At the same time, new studies of climate sensitivity—the amount of warming expected for a doubling of carbon dioxide levels from 0.03 to 0.06 percent in the atmosphere—have suggested that most models are too sensitive. The average sensitivity of the 108 model runs considered by the IPCC is 3.2 degrees C. As Pat Michaels, a climatologist and self-described global warming skeptic at the Cato Institute testified to Congress in July, certain studies of sensitivity published since 2011 find an average sensitivity of 2 degrees C. Such lower sensitivity does not contradict greenhouse-effect physics. The theory of dangerous climate change is based not just on carbon dioxide warming but on positive and negative feedback effects from water vapor and phenomena such as clouds and airborne aerosols from coal burning. Doubling carbon dioxide levels, alone, should produce just over 1 degree C of warming. These feedback effects have been poorly estimated, and almost certainly overestimated, in the models. The last IPCC report also included a table debunking many worries about “tipping points” to abrupt climate change. For example, it says a sudden methane release from the ocean, or a slowdown of the Gulf Stream, are “very unlikely” and that a collapse of the West Antarctic or Greenland ice sheets during this century is “exceptionally unlikely.” If sensitivity is low and climate change continues at the same rate as it has over the past 50 years, then dangerous warming—usually defined as starting at 2 degrees C above preindustrial levels—is about a century away. So we do not need to rush into subsidizing inefficient and land-hungry technologies, such as wind and solar or risk depriving poor people access to the beneficial effects of cheap electricity via fossil fuels.

### 1AR—Transition Bad

#### Transition fails—causes war—consumption would reemerge even worse—try or die assessments are wrong

Monbiot, 9

George Monbiot, The Guardian, 2009, Is there any point in fighting to stave off industrial apocalypse?, [www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change](http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change)

I detect in your writings, and in the conversations we have had, an attraction towards – almost a yearning for – this apocalypse, a sense that you see it as a cleansing fire that will rid the world of a diseased society. If this is your view, I do not share it. I'm sure we can agree that the immediate consequences of collapse would be hideous: the breakdown of the systems that keep most of us alive; mass starvation; war. These alone surely give us sufficient reason to fight on, however faint our chances appear. But even if we were somehow able to put this out of our minds, I believe that what is likely to come out on the other side will be worse than our current settlement.Here are three observations: 1 Our species (unlike most of its members) is tough and resilient; 2 When civilisations collapse, psychopaths take over; 3 We seldom learn from others' mistakes.From the first observation, this follows: even if you are hardened to the fate of humans, you can surely see that our species will not become extinct without causing the extinction of almost all others. However hard we fall, we will recover sufficiently to land another hammer blow on the biosphere. We will continue to do so until there is so little left that even Homo sapiens can no longer survive. This is the ecological destiny of a species possessed of outstanding intelligence, opposable thumbs and an ability to interpret and exploit almost every possible resource – in the absence of political restraint.From the second and third observations, this follows: instead of gathering as free collectives of happy householders, survivors of this collapse will be subject to the will of people seeking to monopolise remaining resources. This will is likely to be imposed through violence. Political accountability will be a distant memory. The chances of conserving any resource in these circumstances are approximately zero. The human and ecological consequences of the first global collapse are likely to persist for many generations, perhaps for our species' remaining time on earth. To imagine that good could come of the involuntary failure of industrial civilisation is also to succumb to denial. The answer to your question – what will we learn from this collapse? – is nothing.

#### Alternatives to growth kill hundreds of millions and cause global conflict—we can’t “*turn off*” the economy.

**Barnhizer 6** — David R. Barnhizer, Emeritus Professor at Cleveland State University’s Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, 2006 (“Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream": The Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review (18 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 595), Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

The scale of social needs, including the need for expanded productive activity, has grown so large that it cannot be shut off at all, and certainly not abruptly. It cannot even be ratcheted down in any significant fashion without producing serious harms to human societies and hundreds of millions of people. Even if it were possible to shift back to systems of local self-sufficiency, the consequences of the transition process would be catastrophic for many people and even deadly to the point of continual conflict, resource wars, increased poverty, and strife. What are needed are concrete, workable, and pragmatic strategies that produce effective and intelligently designed economic activity in specific contexts and, while seeking efficiency and conservation, place economic and social justice high on a list of priorities. n60 The imperative of economic growth applies not only to the needs and expectations of people in economically developed societies but also to people living in nations that are currently economically underdeveloped. Opportunities must be created, jobs must be generated in huge numbers, and economic resources expanded to address the tragedies of poverty and inequality. Unfortunately, natural systems must be exploited to achieve this; we cannot return to Eden. The question is not how to achieve a static state but how to achieve what is needed to advance social justice while avoiding and mitigating the most destructive consequences of our behavior.

### 1AR- Innovation Key- can’t read w/ sustainability

#### We have already crossed the threshold of sustainability – Continued technological advancement is key to undo the damage and prevent extinction of all species

**AtKisson 1** (President and CEO of The AtKisson Group, an international sustainability consultancy to business and government, “Sustainability is Dead— Long Live Sustainability” <http://www.rrcap.unep.org/uneptg06/course/Robert/SustainabilityManifesto2001.pdf>)

The evidence that we are beyond the limits to growth is by now overwhelming: the alarms include climatic change, disappearing biodiversity, falling human sperm counts, troubling slow-downs in food production after decades of rapid expansion, the beginning of serious international tensions over basic needs like water. Wild storms and floods and eerie changes in weather patterns are but a first visible harbinger of more serious trouble to come, trouble for which we are not adequately prepared. Indeed, change of all kinds—in the Biosphere (nature as a whole), the Technosphere (the entirety of human manipulation of nature), and the Noösphere (the collective field of human consciousness)—is happening so rapidly that it exceeds our capacity to understand it, control it, or respond to it adequately in corrective ways. Humanity is simultaneously entranced by its own power, overwhelmed by the problems created by progress, and continuing to steer itself over a cliff. Our economies and technologies are changing certain basic structures of planetary life, such as the balance of carbon in the atmosphere, genetic codes, the amount of forest cover, species variety and distribution, and the foundations of cultural identity. Unless we make technological advances of the highest order, many of the destructive changes we are causing to nature are irreversible. Extinct species cannot (yet) be brought back to life. No credible strategy for controlling or reducing carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere has been put forward. We do not know how to fix what we’re breaking. At the same time, some of the very products of our technology— plutonium, for instance—require of us that we maintain a very high degree of cultural continuity, economic and political stability, and technological capacity and sophistication, far into the future. To ensure our safety and the safety of all forms of life, we must always be able to store, clean up, and contain poisons like plutonium and persistent organic toxins. Eventually we must be able to eliminate them safely. At all times, we must be able to contain the actions of evil or unethical elements in our societies who do not care about the consequences to life of unleashing our most dangerous creations. In the case of certain creations, like nuclear materials and some artificially constructed or genetically modified organisms, our secure custodianship must be maintained for thousands of years. We are, in effect, committed to a high-technology future. Any slip in our mastery over the forces now under our command could doom our descendants—including not just human descendants, but also those wild species still remaining in the oceans and wilderness areas—to unspeakable suffering. We must continue down an intensely scientific and technological path, and we can never stop.

### 1AR- Complexity Sustainable

#### Complexity is sustainable---it’s key to energy innovation and problem-solving that make even highly complex societies sustainable

**Tainter 9** – Joseph A. Tainter, Global Institute of Sustainability and School of Human Evolution and Social Change at Arizona State University, September 9, 2009, “Human Resource Use: Timing and Implications for Sustainability,” online:http://www.theoildrum.com/node/5745

In conclusion, sustainability is not the achievement of stasis. It is not a passive consequence of having fewer humans who consume more limited resources. One must work at being sustainable. The challenges that any society (or other institution) might confront are, for practical purposes, endless in number and infinite in variety. This being so, sustainability is a matter of solving problems. In the conventional view, complexity follows energy. If so, then we should be able to forego complexity voluntarily and reduce our consumption of the resources that it requires. This approach to sustainability implicitly sees the future as a condition of stasis with no challenges. In actuality, major infusions of surplus energy are rare in human history. More commonly, complexity increases in response to problems. Complexity emerging through problem solving typically precedes the availability of energy, and compels increases in its production. Complexity is not something that we can ordinarily choose to forego. Applying this understanding leads to two conclusions. The first is that the solutions commonly recommended to promote sustainability–conservation, simplification, pricing, and innovation–can do so only in the short term. Secondly, long-term sustainability depends on solving major societal problems that will converge in coming decades, and this will require increasing complexity and energy production. Sustainability is not a condition of stasis. It is, rather, a process of continuous adaptation, of perpetually addressing new or ongoing problems and securing the resources to do so.